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CAMPAIGN FINANCING IN ARIZONA
LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS
JANNA BROWN

In 1962 Representative Jack A.
Brown
spent
approximately
$350
getting elected to the Arizona State
House of Representatives where he
served for 6 terms, or 12 years,
before he was defeated.
In 1986, a
little less than 25 years after he
had first run for the legislature,
Mr. Brown spent in excess of $30,000
to successfully unseat an incumbent.
Even controlling for the effects of
inflation,
this
illustration
represents the fact that there has
been an obvious increase in the
amount of money necessary to run for
public office.
In recent years the
average cost of a legislative seat
has doubled or tripled in almost
every state for which there are
records (Jones 1984, 175).
Why the
large
increase?
What
factors
contribute to these rising costs?
More importantly, what measures are
being taken to control them?
These questions are not easily
answered, but the present political
climate in Arizona provides a perfect
opportunity
to
examine
campaign
spending and reform, and provides
insight as to possible answers to
such questions.
Before looking at
the Arizona experience specifically,
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however, I will briefly examine the
broader base of campaign spending and
reform.

Brief History of Campaign
Finance Laws
Not only has campaign spending
risen dramatically at
the
state
level, but at the national level as
well.
Costs
of
congressional
campaigns have skyrocketed in the
last decade, with the average House
open seat campaign running close to
$430,000 (Nelson and Magleby 1989,
35) .
Senate races are even more
expensive, due in part to a six-year
rather than a two-year term.
An
average campaign for an open Senate
seat costs over $3 million (Nelson
and Magleby 1989, 36).
Before 1972 it was much more
difficult to determine exactly how
much money was spent on national
races because there existed only
piecemeal
legislation
regulating
campaigns.
The Federal Election
Campaign
Act
of
1971
(FECA)
established
more
stringent
regulations
and
required
fuller
disclosure of political funding than
ever before (Alexander 1980, 29).
Watergate
caused
increasing
concern over the role of money in
corrupting
u.S.
elections,
which
20
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brought about the passage of the 1974
Amendments
to
the FECA.
These
Amendments placed overall limits on
how
much
could
be
spent
on
campaigning,
provided
public
financing for presidential campaigns,
and
established
political
action
committees
(PACs).
The
1974
Amendments also created the Federal
Election
Commission
(FEC)
to
administer and enforce the new laws.
In 1976, portions of the 1974
FECA
Amendments
were
ruled
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court
in
the
case
Buckley
v.
Valeo.
Limitations
on
expenditures
were
struck down as violations of free
speech
guaranteed
by
the
First
Amendment.
The Court determined,
however, that limitations could be
imposed on candidates who accept
public funding.
Contribution limits
and public disclosure measures were
left intact (Alexander 1980, 34).
Addi tional Amendments were made to
the FECA in 1979.
Essentially, the
bill simplified record keeping and
public reporting requirements and
refined the procedural requirements
of the enforcement process (Alexander
1980,
37) .
As
Edwin
Epstein
observed, "Few developments during
the
past
decade have been more
important
to
American
electoral
politics than the virtual revolution
in campaign financing that occurred
i nth e 1 9 70s" (Ep s t e i n 19 8 0, 3 5 6 ) .
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Accompanying this onslaught of
campaign finance at the federal level
were a number of "post-Watergate"
reforms in many states. From 1972 to
1976, 49 states made some type of
revision to laws regulating political
money (Alexander 1980, 15).
These
laws were largely exper imental and
covered a
wide
range of
reform
tactics--from
strict
aggregate
spending ceilings to tight limits on
individual
contributions.
After
1976,
however,
many
states were
forced to change their laws in order
to comply with the ruling of Buckley
v. Valeo (Alexander 1980, 127).
Today, state campaign financing
remains governed by state law, so any
attempt
to compare
costs across
states is complicated by having to
consider
50
different
sets
of
campaign funding regulations (Jones
1984,172). States' campaign finance
laws
differ
in
many
aspects:
definitions
of
"expenditure"
and
"contribution"; allowances for public
funding; types, time periods, and
publication of disclosure reports.

The Role of State Legislatures
In the 1980s, state legislatures
play
an
increasingly
important
regulatory and policy making role
(Sabato 1984, 118).
Reagan's "new
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federalism"
put
far
more
responsibility into the hands of the
states
(Singer 1989, 1).
Frank
Sorauf asserts that "the diminution
of congressional responsibility in
areas such as social welfare during
the Reagan years may raise the stakes
i n state leg isla t i ve poli tics.
If
policy-making power flows to the
states, so will money seeking to pick
candidates
wi th
congenial
policy
goals" (Sorauf 1988, 261). This, as
Sorauf observed, indicates that money
is playing a larger role at the state
level than ever before.
State legislatures also control
congressional
and
legislative
redistricting
every
decennium.
Because this affects a party's fate
for an en tire decade, the party in
control of a state legislature tries
to draw these lines to obtain the
maximum number of congressional seats
possible.
Thus
the
state
legislatures
are
the
primary
determinants of the party balance in
the U. S. House of Representatives.
Given this important task, increasing
financial emphasis is likely to be
placed on state legislative races by
individuals and groups especially
concerned about influencing the party
control of the U.S. House.
Thi~
is especially likely to
occur in the election cycles prior to
reapportionment.
The
Republican
National Committee (RNC)
realized

23
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this in the 1960s and 1970s and
strengthened their state and local
organizations.
By the late 1970s,
the RNC had instituted a program
designed to influence the outcome of
state legislative races. John Bibby
reports that "the RNC gave direct
financial and technical support to
legislative
candidates
at
an
unprecedented level during the 1978
and 1980 campaigns" (1983, 128).
When
consider ing
the
growing
importance of states'
legislative
functions, it is not surprising that
the number of members who consider
themselves
"careerists"
is
increasing.
According
to State
Legislator's Occupations:
A Decade
of Change, a publication by the
National
Conference
of
State
Legislatures,
the
number
of
legislators
who
consider
the
legislature
to
be
their
sole
profession rose from approximately 9
percent in 1976 to possibly as high
as 20 percent in 1986 (Singer 1989,
l) .
NCSL' s Legislative Management
Program
Director
Sandra
Singer
observed that "it is becoming a fulltime job and a long-term career, and
as might be expected, re-election has
become
the
first
goal
on
many
legislators' agendas" (1988, 1).
Since
a
seat
in
a
state
legislature
has
become
more
attractive than ever, the influence
of money at the state level is also
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mUltiplying.
It follows, then, that
increasing attention is being given
to
legislation
governing
the
financing of state elections. A 1989
NCSL survey of pr ior i ty issues for
state
legislatures
reported
that
campaign finance was rated as the
highest pr ior i ty issue area in the
State Government Issues Category. Of
primary
concern
to
most
state
legislatures, it seems, is working to
see that their electoral systems do
not enable only the well-to-do to
seek public office.

Campaign Finance in Arizona:
A Case Study
Prior to 1986, Arizona had very
little legislation governing campaign
finance.
The
only
significant
requirements were disclosure before
and after the election.
Corporate
and labor union contr ibutions were
also prohibi ted.
These regulations
were too permissive to effectively
control campaign spending in Arizona
elections.
Individuals
worried
by
the
excessive
financial
influence
of
var ious interest groups drafted an
initiative to be placed on the ballot
in the 1986 election.
Proposition
200, the so-called "Clean Government
Initiative" was designed to "limit
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campaign
contributions
so as
to
prevent improper influence over state
and local elected officials and to
foster
public confidence
in the
integrity of government" (Anderson
1988, A17).
Evidently, voters were
concerned about the issue, because
Proposition
200
passed
by
an
overwhelming 2-1 margin.

The Facts About
Proposition 200
Proposition 200 places strict
limits on
the amounts PACs and
individuals
can
contribute
to
candidates.
Under
the
new law
individuals
are
prohibited
from
contributing
more
than
$200
to
local/legislative candidates and more
than $500 to statewide candidates.
As indicated by Table 1, PACs are
bound by the same limits, unless they
are certified by the Secretary of
State as having received funds from
at least 500 individuals in amounts
of $10 or more in the one year period
preceding the last closing report
date.
This
type
of
PAC
may
contribute $1000 to a local candidate
or $2500 for a statewide candidate.
The most stringent limit is the
aggregate limit of $5000 from all
PACs (local candidates) or $50,000
(statewide candidates).
All limits
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apply cumulatively to the primary and
general election.
As prescribed by Proposition 200,
these campaign limits are to be
adjusted annually for inflation. For
instance, the new 1989 aggregate PAC
limit for local races has been raised
to $5,500 rather than $5,000, and the
new individual/PAC limi t for local
candidates is now $220 rather than
$200.
Other provisions of the new law
prohibite the practice of collecting
checks or funds for the purpose of
passing
them onto a
candidate-commonly
called
"bundling",
"earmarking", which is the process of
sending a check to a PAC or other
committee with the specific objective
of passing the contribution on to a
selected candidate, and the transfer
of
funds
from one candidate
to
another. In compliance with previous
Arizona law, corporate funds are not
allowed
to
be
contributed· ~
candidate
elections.
While
the
Fed~ral Tax credit was abolished as
of January 1, 1987, Arizona still
allows tax deductions for political
contributions for state tax purposes.
Individuals can contribute a maximum
of $2000 to all political action
commi t tees a nd----St a tewide and local
candidates in Arizona in a calendar
year.
Contributions to political
parties are exempt from this $2000
limi t.
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There are no limitations on the
amount of money a candidate may
contribute
to
his
or
her
own
campaign.
However, there are some
rules governing such contr ibutions:
If a candidate contributes more than
$10,000 to a local campaign, or
$100,000 to a statewide campaign, he
or she must give written notice of
that contribution within 24 hours to
the Secretary of State and all other
candidates for that office. At that
point, contribution limits do not
apply to the other candidates in that
race until they exceed the $10,000 or
$100,000
contribution
levels.
According to an opinion by Attorney
General Bob Corbin, this apparently
means that until the $10,000/$100,00
limit is met, opponents could accept
contributions
from
PACs
and
individuals in excess of the $200 or
$500
limits
of
Proposition
200
(United For Arizona 1988a, 1).
Proposition 200 is to be enforced
by the County Attorney or Attorney
General who investigate complaints
filed
by
any
qualified
voter.
Violations will be dealt with as
Class One Misdemeanors, with knowing
violations resulting in up to 6
months in jail and up to $1,000 in
fines,
and
unknowing
violations
resultinB in civic penalty and up to
three times the amount of the illegal
contribution.
After the passage of Proposition
28
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200,
there was a great deal of
speculation as to just what its
effects would be.
Public interest
groups such as Arizona Common Cause
praised the new law, saying it would
reduce the flow of special interest
money into political campaigns and
put
an
end
to
the
big
money
individual
contributor
(Anderson
1988, A17).
Other players, such as
incumbent
legislators,
were
understandably less than thrilled
over the passage of "200".
Because
legislators
are
interested in their own electoral
success, it is no wonder that they
are opposed to strict regulations
such as those enacted by Proposition
200.
Dana Larsen,
director of
Arizona Common Cause, observed that
"most
people
there
[in
the
legislature]
do
not
find
great
comfort and joy in Proposition 200.
I
think
it's probably the most
unloved piece of work that's in the
statutes right now" (Van De Voorde
1988,10). But, Larsen maintains, it
is their own fault legislators. are
not happy with the new law, because
"i t was their own inaction on the
issue of campaign finance reform that
brought them this" (Van De Voorde
1988, 10).
As k.i n g
s elf - i n t ere s ted
legislators
to create
the
rules
governing the method by which they
and their challengers are elected is
29
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not the most logical mode of creating
legislation. Yet submitting a long,
complex proposal to a simple yes-orno decision by oftentimes apathetic
or
unknowledgeable
voters
seems
equally inefficient (Broder 1976,
320) .
Whether the public should be
using the initiative process on such
complex issues as campaign finance
reform
is
one
of
the
central
questions
in
the
debate
over
Proposition 200.

The Results of
Proposition 200
Although views differ on the
merit of Proposition 200, an analysis
of 1986 and 1988 contr ibutions and
expenditures data allows conclusions
to be drawn as to the results of the
new law. The most obvious result of
the tough new campaign laws enacted
by the 1986 passage of Proposition
200
was
a
marked
decrease
in
contributions from PACs, as depicted
in
Figure
1.
In
1986,
PACs
contributed $1.1 million to Arizona
candidates. In 1988 the amount of PAC
contributions decreased 65 percent-to $388,136 (Harris 1989, Ai). The
most drastic individual example is
House Minority Leader Art Hamilton,
who dropped from $43,269 in PAC
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contributions in 1986 to $4,834 in
1988,
a
reduction of nearly 90
percent.
Total contributions also
decreased in 1988--from a 1986 total
of $2.4 million to $1.8 million, a
decrease of 25 percent.
For the
first
time
since
1974,
total
expenditures
decreased
from
the
previous
year's
totals.
1988
candidates spent a total of $1.8
million, down from $2.2 million in
1986, a 20 percent decrease.
As
shown
in Figure
2,
the average
winning
candidate for
the
state
legislature
spent
$19,565,
as
compared to $24,420 in 1986.
This
represents a total dollar reduction
of $4,855 per race, and a percentage
reduction of 20 percent.
These
figures
provide
a
remarkable
contrast
to
previous
contributions
and
expenditures.
Common Cause of Arizona has been
tracking campaign spending and PAC
contributions in Arizona since 1974,
where they have observed a steady
escalation of PAC involvement and
expenditures by candidates (it should
be noted that these percentages are
not in constant dollars and do not
account
for
the
effects
of
inflation).
Between 1984 and 1986,
campaign spending increased by 54
percent.- In 1986, for the first time
in
Arizona's
history,
winning
candidates spent over $2 million for
seats in the legislature.
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Also for the first time, PACs
contributed over $1 million to those
races for an average of over $12,500
per race--the first time this figure
topped $10,000. In light of these
figures, the 1988 data provide a
remarkable
contrast
to
previous
year's data. In sum, Proposition 200
decreased the amount of money raised
and spent by the winning candidates
for the Legislature.

The Role of PACs
The
role
political
action
committees play in our electoral
system is a topic surrounded by much
debate.
Though PACs have been
extremely
influential
in
congressional elections for several
years now, their rise at the state
level has been more recent. As Larry
Saba to observed, "There is Ii t tIe
question
that
PACs
contribute a
growing proportion of campaign money
in
states
and
localities,
particularly in races for the state
legislature"
(1984,
117).
For
example, between 1974 and 1982, the
number of registered PACs in Arizona
increased by more than five times
(Sorauf 1988, 269).
Larrj
Sabato
terms
the
establishment of many national PACs
at
the
state
level
the
" new
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federalism" of PACs (1984, 120). In
1981-82, more than four in ten of the
federal- multicandidate
PACs
also
contr ibuted
to
state
and
local
candidates.
Sabato observed that
"even if the U.S. Congress were still
the center of a group's attention, it
had good reason to look to the state
capi tals:
most recent congressmen
first served as state legislators,
and a contribution made early in
their careers was likely to be well
remembered" (Sabato 1984, 118).
The most detailed study on PAC
influence at the state legislative
level was conducted in California.
Its results are synonymous with those
in Arizona--campaign costs are rising
dramatically,
PACs
are
extremely
influential, PAC support is necessary
for
a
successful
campaign,
and
incumbents are widening their fund
raising advantage over challengers
(California Commission on Campaign
Financing 1985, 3).
Ruth Jones, an
expert
in
the
field
of
state
legislative campaign finance, found
that
not
all
PACs
exert
equal
influence.
Recent state PAC growth
has
been
disproportionate
among
business and professional interests
(Jones 1984, 188).
There is little consensus among
the key-players of the system as to
the degree of influence exerted by
PACs.
Obviously, many people are
concerned
that
PAC
money
buys
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influence. Alan Rosenthal, director
of the Eagleton Institute of Politics
at Rutgers University, says that PAC
influence
"gives
an
unseemly
appearance because it looks like
people are buying influence.
Legislators are aware and concerned
about contributors.
I don't know
what that buys but certainly it buys
a sympathetic ear" (Singer 1988, 25).
Other observers feel that because
the public is not extremely aware of
the
activities
of
their
state
legislature,
corruption
is
more
likely to occur at the state level
than in Congress, where the members
are
subject
to
almost
constant
scrutiny. In comparing PAC influence
in the Missour i legislature to PAC
influence in the U.S. Congress, Jerry
Brekke summar ized: "At the national
level,
the
great
publici ty
and
concern expressed over PAC activity
may, to some extent, be a restriction
on
possible abuses.
Since
the
Missouri legislature and many state
legislatures are not subject to such
public scrutiny, PACs may present
more serious problems than they do at
the national level
(Brekke 1988,
103)."
The
foremost
issue
in
the
Proposi tion 200 debate is centered
around PACs and how much influence
they should have.
An interesting
argument explaining the emergence of
PACs in recent years is proposed by
34

:

CAMPAIGN FINANCING
Lee Ann Elliott. She claims that the
PAC movement is a natural and healthy
addi tion to the Arner ican poli tical
process.
Ell iot t
compares
the
development of PACs to overall social
changes
currently
taking
place,
claiming that the biggest change in
our political behavior has grown out
of the increasing mobili ty of our
society.
We used to associate as
neighborhood groups, but this is no
longer
the
case.
Improved
communication and transportation have
caused
us
to
broaden
our
associations. This change has had an
effect on political behavior because
political activity no longer revolves
around
precinct,
or
neighborhood
poli tics.
We are not influenced by
neighborhood leaders, but rather by
occupational
or
socio-economic
leaders. Thus, asserts Elliott, the
rise of PACs is merely a response to
these developing behavioral changes.
These socio-economic organizations
have developed as a substitute for
geographic
or
neighborhood
associations (Elliott 1980, 540-1).
If examined in terms of Elliott's
argument,
strict
limits
on
the
ability of PACs to contribute to
candidates are an invasion on the
right of individuals to associate in
groups, - whether those groups are
geographical or socio-economic.
A
related
argument
is
proposed by
Robert L'Ecuyer, a Phoenix attorney,

35

PI SIGMA ALPHA REVIEW
lobbyist, and campaign consultant.
He asserts that the central problem
of
Proposi tion
200
is
that
it
severely handicaps groups of two to
500 people (1988, A16).
Because
these groups do not meet the "SuperPAC" requi rement of 500 contr ibutors,
they are limited to donations of
$200--the same amount an individual
is able to give.
This is a much
tighter requirement than the federal
statute--where
only 50 rather than
500
people can gain
"Super-PAC"
status, and thus have higher limits
on how much they may contribute.
L'Ecuyer further argues that the
founders of the U.S. Constitution
understood that an individual alone
is
no
match
for
big
power
or
influence, and expected that groups
would be formed in order to promote
government attention to their needs
and concerns. This is why freedom of
association is included in the Bill
of Rights.
L'Ecuyer cites a hypothetical
example to illustrate his point: 50
people in a neighborhood upset by a
zoning decision decide to form a
committee and to support a candidate
for mayor.
Each person can spare
$10, which they realize is a small
amount, so they pool their money and
send $ 500 to the candidate.
Under
Proposition 200,
this is illegal
because the group cannot contribute
over $200.
The zoning problem was
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created by a rich neighbor.
He and
his wife can each give $200, a total
of $400, to the opposing candidate.
Furthermore,
the
big
corporation
planning to build on the rich man's
land
can
run
an
II independent
expendi ture campaign II through its PAC
and spend an unlimited amount.
How
can the neighborhood be expected to
compete
if
it
cannot
pool
its
resources?
This is a valid argument. Small
groups should not be discouraged from
attempting to make an impact on
politics by contribution limits that
are too restrictive.
In L'Ecuyer's
words,
liThe
change
in
law
[Proposition 200] was intended to
1 imi t PACs set up by big labor and
corporations.
Instead, it strangles
every small and medium-sized group
trying to give the little guy a
voice ll (L'Ecuyer 1988b, A16).
Another controversy associated
with
PACs
is
that
they
disproportionately favor incumbents.
Incumbency is a very strong factor in
determining the outcome of elections.
Nationally,
98
percent
of
congressional officeholders won reelection in 1988. The numbers at the
state level are lower, but still
significant.
Around 80 percent of
state lawmakers seeking re-election
are returned to office (Hansen 1988,
:'..4).
William T. Pound, executive
director of the National Conference
37
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of State Legislatures, believes that
because
of
sophisticated
redistricting, superior fundraising
abilities, and power of incumbency
there are "very few state legislative
seats that are competitive" (Hansen
1988, 16).
One of the constants in PAC
behavior is that PAC spending favors
incumbents (Sorauf 1988, 266).
The
reason
is
simple:
PACs
favor
incumbents because incumbents are
more
likely
to
win.
In most
circumstances, it does not benefit a
PAC to give to a losing candidate.
For this reason, nearly 99 percent of
PAC money at the state legislative
level goes to incumbents (Singer
1988,
25).
Gary
Jacobson
has
concluded that because incumbents are
generally better known, they need
less campaign money but are able to
raise more.
Challengers, however,
need more money but have trouble
raising it (Jacobson 1980).
This
paradox is one of the fundamental
problems of the current campaign
finance system. The
Arizona
data
clearly show that incumbents receive
more PAC funds than challengers.
In
1986,
the
average
non-incumbent
brought in about $5,000 less than the
average
House
of
Representatives
incumbent.
Only three of the nonincumbent candidates raised more than
$10,000
in PAC money,
while
31
incumbents in the House raised more
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than
$10,000.
No
challengers
accumulated
over
$20,000
of PAC
dollars, yet seven House incumbents
topped $20,000.

Interpretations Of Proposition
200--Strengths and Weaknesses
~here
is
no
dispute
that
Proposition
200
decreased
PAC
contributions tremendously.
Also,
the candidates' disclosure reports
revealed that less money was received
and spent in legislative races than
ever before.
Does this mean, as
Common Cause asserts, that candidates
"took
less
money
and
fewer
obligations from the PACs?" (Arizona
Common
Cause
1989,
1)
Not
necessarily. Not everyone perceived
Proposition 200 as such a panacea.
Robert L'Ecuyer is perhaps the most
vocal opponent.
He said of the new
laws, "After 18 months of detailed
study of campaign finance statutes
and cases from all 50 states and the
federal government, I have concluded
that
Arizona's
campaign
finance
statutes are among the four or five
worst in the U.S." (L'Ecuyer 1988a).
Conclusions about the overall utility
of Proposition 200 can be reached by
examining these opposing viewpoints.
However, this is a difficult task and
is largely speculative considering
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the new law has only been in effect
for one election cycle.
Proponents of Proposition 200
cite
the
decrease
in
PAC
contributions as the primary benefit
of the new law. This is expected to
have the long-term effect of forcing
candidates to rely more heavily on
smaller
contributions
from
individuals. This is especially true
for incumbents who are, as former
Common Cause director John Anderson
claimed, "going to have to broaden
their appeal beyond the relatively
narrow circle of traditional special
interest contributors" (1988, A17).
Related to the limitation of PAC
contributions will be an increase of
competitiveness, with a rise in the
number
of
serious
challengers~
Again, incumbents are likely to be
hurt by the increased ability of
challengers to raise enough funds to
mount a respectable campaign.
Another anticipated result of
Proposition 200 is the strengthening
of the political parties. Political
parties are exempt from the $2000
limit that individuals can give to
candidates
and
PACs.
This
is
expected to encourage individuals to
contribute to the parties and let the
parties distribute those funds to the
candidates they desire.
Proposition 200 prohibits the
transfer of campaign funds from one
candidate to another. This prohibits
40
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members of the House and Senate from
giving money to other members to
acquire legislative influence. Some
claim this is undue influence, while
others argue that fundraising is a
tool that the leaders need since many
traditional leadership methods have
eroded in recent years. Thus, it is
argued that transfers strengthen the
parties
by
making
individual
legislators
more
accountable
to
leadership (Singer 1988, 27).
The
prohibition
of
these
transfers,
however, as in Proposition 200, keeps
the
legislative
leadership
from
raising large sums of money and
doling it out to loyal incumbents or
recruiting
challengers
to
defeat
uncooperative incumbents.
While Proposi tion 200 may have
its strengths, it is not without its
weaknesses.
Var ious
"loopholes"
exist
that
allow
PACs
and
corporations
to donate
funds
to
influence elections in ways that are
not
included
in
the candidates'
reported
expenditures
and
contributions.
For
example,
unlimited independent expenditures
are allowed under Proposi tion 200.
Independent expenditures are funds
spent
by
an
individual
or
organization
for
or
against
a
candidate
but
without
any
coordination
with
the
candidate.
They offer a legal, effective means
of influencing a campaign since they
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are
not
prohibited by state or
federal statutes.
I n d e pen den t
expenditure campaigns (lECs) have
traditionally
been
run
for
congressional candidates, though with
the passage of strict limitations on
PAC
contributions such as
those
imposed by Proposition 200, lECs are
turning up at the state level as
well.
Ninety-five percent of the
business PACs in Arizona do not meet
the Super Pac requirement of 500
contributors, so they are able to
donate only $200 per candidate. PAC
funds, then, are still multiplying,
while the number of candidates able
to
accept
funds
has
decreased
rapidly.
Thus, lECs present a way
for PACs to legally exert influence
on
desired
races.
United
for
Arizona, a nonprofit trust that has
helped set up most of Arizona's
business
PACs,
sponsored a
poll
designed to measure public opinion of
political campaigns run independently
of candidates.
The study concluded
that
the
public
is
generally
favorable toward such campaigns, and
therefore United recommended that
TECs for Arizona races provide a
visible
alternative
to
direct
candidate
support
and
can
be
successfully run with only a slight
degree of risk involved (United for
Arizona 1988b, 4-5).
Another
"loophole",
or
alternative
method
of
PAC
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contributions to candidates occurs in
the
"constituent
communications"
provision.
Attorney General Bob
Corbin issued an opinion stating that
money raised for newsletters does not
fall under Proposition 200 and does
not have to be reported as long as
the publications are paid for sixty
days pr ior to an elect ion (Van De
Voorde 1988, 10).
This appears to
allow PACs and corporations to donate
unlimited amounts of money to a
candidate, as long as it is used for
a newsletter. But since legislators
are not required to make any public
accounting of these funds, no one
knows who contributes how much to
whom or how the money is actually
spent.
One reason PACs and corporations
are turning to these alternatives is
because
they
have
more
funds
available than there are candidates
available to accept them, because of
Proposition 200's $5,000 aggregate
PAC contributions limit. Because of
this limit, legislators are likely to
begin their campaigns earlier and
earlier in the election cycle (United
for Arizona 1988c, 1). PAC managers
are realizing that many legislators
will "max out" at the allowable
$5,000 months before they -actively
start campaigning.
As Uni ted for
Arizona complains, "Our problem with
Proposition 200 is it forces PACs
into a ridiculous race to see which
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25 can "beat" the others in making
contributions
before
the
$5,000
aggregate is reached."
In light of
this problem, it is no wonder that
PACs and corporations are searching
for
other
viable
options
of
supporting candidates.
The enforcement provisions of
Proposition 200 are very ambiguous.
Supposedly the County Attorney or the
Attorney General will investigate
claims filed by voters. Not only is
the wording of the provision vague,
there is no automatic method of
oversight--only
complaints
are
investigated.
It seems that the
responsibility of enforcement ought
to
be
entrusted
ei ther
to
the
Secretary of State or to some type of
independent agency similar to the
Federal Election Commission at the
national level.
A problem related to the lack of
an enforcement agency lies in the
disclosure laws.
Though the public
disclosure
of
contributions
and
expendi tures has been a large step
forward in decreasing the amount of
illegal money involved in elections,
there is still room for improvement.
At the present time, the Secretary of
State
houses
the
disclosure
information but publishes no type of
compilation or report. The rationale
behind public disclosure is that it
will in itself police candidates into
complying with campaign finance laws.
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If disclosure reports were published
in a timely manner, they would be
much
more
likely
to
impact
candidates' behavior.

Conclusion
It
is
clear
that
there are
differing
opinions
regarding
the
effectiveness of Proposition 200. As
previously stated, it is difficult to
draw
conclusions
about
how well
Proposition 200 will work after just
one election cycle has elapsed. The
most visible effect in the 1988
election was the reduced amount of
contributions
from
PACs.
Legislators, PACs, public interest
groups such as Common Cause, the
media, and the general public all
have differ ing opinions as to what
aspects of Proposition 200, if any,
should be revised.
In general,
legislators favor raising PAC limits.
Common Cause advocates leaving the
limits
as
strict
as
they
are
presently, plus eliminating apparent
loopholes in Proposition 200.
Reaching a compromise between these
groups with competing interests will
not be easily accomplished. A joint
legislat~ve
committee is currently
considering revising the campaign
finance statutes. For the most part,
the proposed changes will relax the
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present
contribution
limits
and
structure Arizona's campaign finance
system-more like the federal system.
Clearly, these proposals will not
satisfy all of the players involved,
nor are they likely to solve all of
the existing problems.
Likewise,
Proposition 200 did not solve every
problem
nor
satisfy
every
participant.
Nonetheless, I would
argue
that
both
attempts
are
beneficial in helping to solve the
complex
problems
associated
with
campaign
financing
in
Arizona
legislative elections.
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